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Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 
6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the 
world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language. // In brief, the 
world must thereby become quite another, it must so to speak wax or wane as a 
whole. // The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy. 
 
6.431 As in death, too, the world does not change, but ceases. 
 
6.4311 Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through. // If by eternity is 
understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally 
who lives in the present. // Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is 
without limit. 
Heidegger, Being and Time: 
If I take death into my life, acknowledge it, and face it squarely, I will free myself 
from the anxiety of death and the pettiness of life - and only then will I be free to 
become myself. 
Wittgenstein, Remarks on the philosophy of psychology I: 20: 
[A]n interpretation becomes an expression of experience. And the interpretation is 
not an indirect description; no, it is the primary expression of the experience. 	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1. This essay is a (more or less philosophical) 
account or allegory of my viewing(s) of Lars von 
Trier’s remarkable film, Melancholia (2011).1 It is 
personal, and philosophical. (The personal here 
turns out, potentially, to be philosophical.) Von 
Trier’s film in turn is clearly among other things a 
(brilliantly accurate) allegory of (his) depression; 
and it is also clearly (though at the very same time) 
much more than that. In expressing my experience 
of the film and the world (and my experience as a 
part time mega-melancholic – which is part of my 
basis for using the adjective “brilliantly accurate” in 
the previous sentence), my essay is inevitably 
personal, ‘person-relative’. Furthermore: This is an 
inevitable feature of therapeutic philosophy, the 
philosophy practiced most famously by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. As the later Gordon Baker for 
example explained clearly2: such philosophy 
responds to the individual reader (/ viewer). And 
vice versa. In a kind of dialogue or (to use the term 
that Melancholia prefers) dance. . .i 
2. Why do I call my take on Melancholia a 
philosophical one? Well, let me seek to explain. 
Let’s start with one of the apparently-odd plot-
features of the film. The entire action takes place 
within the grounds of a family home, a chateau: in 
part, because Justine (Kirsten Dunst) – and in fact, 
later, both the two main protagonists – apparently 
cannot leave the chateau. Each time that Justine 
attempts to take her horse across the little bridge, 
she fails. And near the end, the same uncanny 
failure hits Claire (Charlotte Gainsbourg), in her 
golf-buggy, the last vehicle able to move (albeit 
with the risible speed and style of a golf-buggy) in 
their little world. …I believe that this uncanny 
trappedness is a key to the film. What does it 
mean?ii 
3. We can (and should) think here of Last Year at 
Marienbad,3 so clearly inter-textually telegraphed in 
the opening images of the sculpted plants which 
have two shadows (In Marienbad, they cast just 
one – but the people there cast none at all).iii In 
Marienbad too, it is impossible to escape the 
chateau. One is trapped, on my reading of that 
marvellous, puzzling film, in one’s own Reason. In 
i. Throughout this paper, I dance in a 
‘dialogue’ with – am in ‘conversation’ 
with – Steven Shaviro’s fascinating 
paper, “Melancholia or, the romantic 
anti-sublime”: 
http://reframe.sussex.ac.uk/sequence
1/1-1-MELANCHOLIA-or-The-
Romantic-Anti-Sublime/ (The page 
references that I give to his work in 
these notes are to this webpage as it 
prints out). Shaviro’s paper, with 
which this paper is in sequence, I 
engage with explicitly through this 
apparatus of 33 sidenotes (signalled 
by the use of roman-numerals). There 
are also 33 endnotes for other 
references (signalled by decimal 
numerals). My aim in these sidenotes 
is to show how my interpretation of 
the film, as I see it, complements and 
ultimately contradicts 
Shaviro’s. {sidenote i} 
 
ii. Shaviro suggests repeatedly and 
intelligently that one thing it means is 
that the world of the 1% is largely 
closed to the rest of us (Cf. also n.iv, 
below). But I will argue below that (as 
Shaviro perhaps implies on p.6 of his 
essay) there is a deeper ‘existential’ 
meaning to it, a meaning that 
connects for instance with the therapy 
present in Buddhism (to the effect 
that the greatest suffering comes from 
the sense of continuing self/ego, a 
suffering that peaks in the 
condemnedness-to-self of the 
inveterate melancholic), and with the 
words of Bob Marley’s great song, 
Running Away. (Other obvious 
possible meanings would be: that it 
allegorises death (this was pointed out 
to me by Kristof Bodnar), or Hell, 
which are also of course states, 
relevant to the film’s theme, that 
cannot be escaped.) {sidenote ii} 
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one’s – in the film’s ‘character’s – own half-dead 
hyper-rational minds. In psychosis as understood 
roughly along the lines envisaged by Louis Sass in 
his Madness and Modernism.4 In the case of 
Melancholia, we are dealing primarily, it would 
seem, with neurosis: with ‘affective disorders’. The 
trap in this (similar and dissimilar) case is simply (in) 
one’s life. The trap is one’s mind. (Neurosis is: being 
trapped in one’s own mind, and hating it. Psychosis 
is: being trapped in and by one’s own mind 
without even realising that one is.) The chateau is a 
lived world. The chateau is your mind. You can’t 
escape it.iv 
4. The magnificently-depicted utter futility of 
Claire’s effort to run away, by getting into a big 
strong car – a 4×4 – and then a golf-buggy, and 
then just running… Where? The interaction at that 
point between her and Justine here is startlingly 
reminiscent of the interaction between Deckard 
and Roy at the climactic moments of the famous 
chase in Blade Runner, as the latter asks the former, 
as Deckard seeks pointlessly to escape his fate, his 
being-toward-death: “Where are you going?”… 
Justine uses the exact same verbal formulation, to 
Claire. 
5. The point: there is nowhere to run to. Nowhere 
to go. There is no escape. You can’t run away from 
your own most death, nor from the present 
moment. (As Leo (Cameron Spurr) later puts it: 
“Dad says there’s nothing to do then. Nowhere to 
hide.”) The only ‘escape’ from what Freud called 
“ordinary unhappiness” / anxiety, and, still more so, 
from melancholia, is (as Buddhism has long 
indicated) acceptance. To ‘escape’, paradoxically, 
you have to embrace. To accept what is happening 
right now, to embrace it; and to embrace others. 
(And this, as I will discuss below, is what Justine at 
this point in the film is managing, for the first time, 
to do, in both a very direct and a symbolically-rich 
way.) There is no (other) escape. This existential 
point is starkly literalised in Melancholia by the 
whole planet being about to be wiped out. 
6. Melancholia has a way of bashing the viewer 
over the head with a number of stark, heavily-
iii. The rich intertextuality of Melancholia 
is not sufficiently appreciated, in 
Shaviro’s essay (see especially p.2). For 
instance: it isn’t just that the Breughel 
painting “Hunters in the snow” 
appears in Tarkovsky’s Solaris as well 
as in Melancholia – it plays a pivotal 
role in that film, a film that clearly that 
Melancholia is clearly ‘in sequence’ 
with. As for Marienbad: Melancholia is 
clearly a rich re-writing of it. It shows 
us psychopathological trappedness, as 
Marienbad does (it plays the neurotic 
to Resnais’s psychotic); but, unlike 
Resnais’s film, in the final seven 
minutes it actually offers a genuine 
escape-route. Crucially, as I remark in 
section 3, above, Shaviro doesn’t 
mention that the second shot of 
Melancholia’s prelude, which 
remembers Marienbad, shows us 
every object casting two shadows, 
whereas in Marienbad the objects 
didn’t cast any shadows at all; only the 
people did. Marienbad was a world of 
ghosts, a world where mind or spirit 
was real and matter not; Melancholia 
by contrast sees, in Justine, the 
midwifing of a return from a life of 
being ‘stuck’ in the mind to the actual 
world, just in time (i.e. before the 
world is obliterated). {sidenote iii} 
 
iv. As Shaviro points out, it’s not easy to 
get into this world, either: Think back 
to the struggle of the wedding 
limousine, which seemed a simple bit 
of fun at the start of the film, and 
which Shaviro decodes as echoing the 
failure to consummate of Justine and 
Michael (Alexander Skarsgård) (“How 
do I put it in?”, Justine asks. In gear, 
that is…). But now (i.e. in connection 
with the point I am making about the 
existential and psychical meaning of 
the closed world of the chateau) it 
takes on a different hue: as connoting 
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signalled symbols. The most obvious of which is 
calling the blue planet about to crash into Earth 
‘Melancholia’; a metaphor for Justine’s condition. 
(Similarly, the music is gloriously extreme;v the 
whole ghastly-wedding scenario is way over-the-
top; etc.) 
7. However, look for example at that remarkable 
opening sequence.5 When one thinks back to this 
‘prelude’, from the end of the film, one notices that 
virtually none of the scenes presented there are 
present anywhere in the body of the film. For 
instance, the scene showing the final trio of the 
film: but standing, facing the camera, separate, on 
the lawn at night, dressed up in their wedding 
gear, but with the two ‘moons’ behind them (as 
was not yet the case, during the wedding). It 
almost looks like a publicity-still for the film. My 
take on this shot: This is how the three of them 
would have been, had Melancholia come to hit on 
the night of the wedding. Apart. Before the journey 
on which Justine leads herself and them, through 
rock-bottom, to mutuality and an affirmation of life 
made directly in the face of mortality. 
8. Or again, the little scene of Justine walking 
through the forest in her wedding dress, so, so, so 
slowly, held back by the creepers (this scene, we 
later discover, is a direct ‘representation’ of 
Justine’s experience, as she attempts to explain it 
to Claire); and the parallel scene of Claire, seeking 
desperately to carry her boy ‘to safety’ across the 
19th green, but sinking in so deep with each 
infinitely-slow step; these are visual metaphors 
of/for the mental states from which the sisters are, 
hopelessly, seeking to flee from (and thus 
inadvertently entrenching – see below). 
9. It might still be said that, once one notices them 
and thinks about them, these ‘visual metaphors’ at 
least are rather obvious. Turn then instead to the 
question of why Part 1 of the film is called ‘Justine’, 
Part 2 ‘Claire’. And to the question of why (for 
instance) the wedding scenario in Part 1 is so 
madly over-the-top. If one does so, then I think one 
will start to understand the subtlety lying behind 
part of the limit-conditions of this 
lived world. {sidenote iv} 
 
v. Shaviro understands the importance 
of the music in the film better than 
most critics, though his take on the 
music still isn’t quite right, and isn’t 
(for my money) sufficiently generous. 
He doesn’t mention, for instance, that 
the tune and themes of the Prelude 
recur insistently during Tristan and 
Isolde – much as they do during 
Melancholia (see p.3-4 of his 
text). {sidenote v} 
 
vi. As elaborated in section 17 of my 
paper here: Depression is a solution, a 
preferred way of life; for it offers an 
illusory safety (illusory, because there 
is no limit to how bad it can get, as we 
get a sense of at the opening of Part 2 
of the film. Contrast the true safety 
discussed in my section 23). A semi-
willed separateness/retreat. (Shaviro’s 
discussions of willing need I think to 
be complicated by the difficulty, in 
psychopathology, including some of 
the self-deceptive psychopathology of 
everyday life, in setting out the extent 
to which what is in play is an act (i.e. 
willed) or an affliction. For discussion, 
see e.g. pp.73-4 of Louis Sass’s 
Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the 
Light of Modern Art, Literature and 
Thought, Harvard University Press, 
1994.) {sidenote vi} 
 
vii. Depression, Wilkinson and Pickett 
have taught us (see Wilkinson, Richard 
and Pickett, Kate, The Spirit Level: Why 
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do 
Better, Allen Lane, 2009) is 
probabilified by inequality. This point 
neatly buttresses Shaviro’s helpful 
critique of the sad world of the 1% as 
this film shows it to us (see n.ii, above). 
Why does inequality probabilify higher 
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some surface unsubtleties. 
10. For the deliberately plodding telegraphing of 
one or two of the film’s central metaphors is the 
counterpart of a much-subtler, sinuously-delicate 
way in which metaphors that are not merely 
literalised, not straightforwardly paraphrasable, 
enter repeatedly into the film. Precisely because of 
the blatancy of some of the basic 
symbols/metaphors of the film, these are by 
contrast easy to miss (and have been missed by the 
plodding reviewers of the film – when has such a 
fine film last been so almost-universally under-
appreciated by its reviewers?6 
11. So for instance, as I said earlier: the chateau is a 
world. But more than that: what we are given in 
Part 1 is Justine’s world. This world is very like the 
world that all of us live in (They fuck you up, your 
Mum and Dad; and rampant capitalism does, too); 
and yet unlike it (except for those of us who are 
personally familiar with a serious amount of 
melancholia). One can sympathise with why she 
would be so troubled, when one meets the crazy, 
‘normal’ people in and governing her life. But it’s 
more complicated than that: 
12. The arc of the journey the film takes one on is 
closely tied to a complex sequence of one’s 
identifications and dis-identifications with Justine, 
and then with Claire. As outlined in (11), above: 
This leads in effect to a delicate play with the 
meaning of ‘world’ in the film that is the direct 
counterpart of or complement to the deliberate 
plodding in the Melancholia-as-a-world-perhaps-
about-to-smash-into-our-world metaphor. Here is 
an outline very rough, massively over-crude sketch 
of the main elements of this sequence (abstracting 
again from person-sensitive issues such as one’s 
experience or otherwise with melancholia): 
A. From the start of the prelude, Justine is an 
Other, a haunted figure. 
B. Then, from the start of Part 1, she seems 
perhaps just a normal gal, a normal bride. 
(Look at her giggling in the car at the failure 
societal levels of depression? A key 
reason, Wilkinson and Pickett suggest, 
is because it ‘forces’ one into seeking 
status by means of one’s capacity to 
obtain material ‘goods’ / consumables 
(e.g. luxury houses, orchards, big cars). 
This connects directly with the point 
under discussion in n.7, 
above. {sidenote vii} 
 
viii. Shaviro suggests (p.5) that Justine’s 
naked planet-bathing manifests her 
finding “her depression confirmed by 
the prospect of imminent doom.” 
Compare and contrast the following 
interesting interpretation, offered by 
my student, Alex White, in a draft of 
his “Melancholia: a philosophical 
interpretation” (unpublished): 
“Neither rejecting nor attempting to 
escape, we see Justine beautifully 
strewn naked, illuminated only by the 
blue rays of the looming planet, 
Melancholia, in the middle of the 
night – no longer trying to run away 
from her demons, we see her wildly 
confronting melancholia in the most 
dramatic and emotionally powerful 
fashion. From this moment, we begin 
to see a transformation in Justine 
becoming more self-dependent on 
the help [sic.] from her sister and 
gradually coming to grasp with [sic.] 
her melancholia. Although this is not 
an instant fix, the crucial thing to note 
is that Justine ceases to resist her 
feelings and enters a gradual phase of 
untangling her condition. Depicted by 
her increased overt affection and care 
for [Claire’s] young child, we can see 
Justine making genuine attempts to, 
not reject her fate but, accept 
melancholia… The result of this is that 
for the first time in the film, we see her 
transform from metaphorically already 
living in death – consumed by 
melancholia – to her entering the 
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of the chauffeur to get the limousine to 
penetrate its way up the chateau’s winding 
road.) 
C. But we come to see gradually that she is 
haunted. That she has been putting a brave 
face on things. That her smiles are largely a 
(sometimes bravura) performance. As already 
mentioned, it’s understandable perhaps that 
she should be so, when one starts to 
appreciate her (largely dreadful) place within 
her family (Her depressed mood is first 
brought out by her parents’ truly-terrible 
‘wedding speeches’), job, life. The film 
explores the reasons forvi as well as the 
unreasoned-ness of depression (It is not as if 
Justine’s (dismal) life is enough reason to be 
permanently melancholic. On the contrary, 
we eventually realise with her that even in 
the valley of the shadow of death there is 
every reason to feel love and even joy. To 
escape the confines of one’s mind as it has 
been… The film is an increasingly convincing 
(as one watches it, as it goes into depth) 
portrayal of melancholia (of ‘depression’). Of 
how it is based on something – and based on 
nothing. And of how it can be accepted – and 
thus overcome.). The film undercuts the 
absurdity – the widespread, ghastly illusion – 
of the idea that one can be ‘made’ happy by 
things (especially, by things).7 Over and over, 
even into Part 2 of the film, characters insist 
that Justine ought to be happy; and there is 
endless talk of Justine (and eventually Claire, 
too, talks this way about herself) being made 
to be happy. The skin-crawling ghastliness of 
the scene where the bride is supposed to toss 
her bouquet, the uncomprehending smiling 
faces of those staring up at her at this point, is 
a lovely visual version of this. The point, we 
eventually understand (and experience?), is 
that, when one really lets go of the counter-
productive effort to project a state that is not 
one’s present state, only then can one start to 
attain a kind of contentment, a joy in the 
moment. 
living and embracing powerful 
moments of love for her family and 
acceptance of her melancholic 
disposition which cannot be escaped. 
…Justine…has to stop denying 
[melancholia] to herself and 
wallowing in the vast comforts of self-
pity. This is the metaphor [...] which 
Von Trier encapsulates so well in the 
stunning sequence of Justine lying 
naked before Melancholia. This is the 
first time in the film that we see her 
stop running.” This intriguing take – 
on what (if interpreted-) otherwise 
(see endnote 11) I find the least 
impressive scene in the film – actually 
fits pretty neatly with the ‘sequence’ 
of psychological turns that I depict in 
section 12, above. Its main defect it 
seems to me is that it does not 
account for why she is naked, and why 
she seems to be erotically aroused, or 
a seductress, at this moment. 
{sidenote viii} 
 
ix. Very unfortunately, as I detail in 
sidenotes xiii-xvii, below, Shaviro 
rejects this element of Justine’s 
journey. He speaks (p.12) of Justine 
implicitly gesturing at a “’fantasy of 
the future’ when she cares for Leo”. 
No: she is mourning a sense of 
lostness and a lost future; and we 
should all mourn for such loss when it 
affects (those who are collectively) our 
children, especially when we bear 
some responsibility for the loss (as, in 
the real world, we (often) 
do). {sidenote ix} 
 
x. Mark Fisher (cited by Shaviro, on p.1), 
writes that “it is easier to imagine the 
end of the world than it is to imagine 
the end of capitalism”. Joel Kovel’s The 
Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism 
or the End of the World (Zed Books, 
2007, 2nd Edition) is actually the key 
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D. She is othered, then, in her depression; and 
we keep veering back to her, in our 
recognition of the madness of her (our) 
world.8 
E. But we gradually come to appreciate that 
the wedding party is a hyperbole; it is not 
even meant to be realistic. This is most stark 
in the behaviour of the the character of Jack 
(Stellan Skarsgård), Justine’s boss (as 
grotesque and cruel as anything out of de 
Sade – and he is the ‘best man’!) and his 
minion, Tim (Brady Corbet). This is a kind of 
Kafkaesque absurdist extreme of no-escape: 
The profit-motive and a rigorously utilitarian 
attitude to other people won’t leave you 
alone for even one moment, not even at your 
wedding. This gives us some insight into our 
market-mad world, by touching 
uncomfortably on what might well be 
claimed to be its contemporary essence; and 
it gives us some insight into Justine’s world. In a 
world of depression-retreat, of being locked 
in one’s own ego, and of times of high 
anxiety, everything can seem extreme: too 
much trouble, such that one cannot even lift 
one’s leg into the bathtub; Or everything a 
tremendous threat that can’t be overcome. 
The wedding party gives us Justine’s world: 
we eventually inhabit that world (as if) from 
the inside. We realise something about the 
world of the unhappy; just how deeply it 
differs from the world of the happy. The only 
way to come to see something like that is 
some kind of extreme vicarious experience: 
such as that of a wedding-from-hell which is 
really a wedding in hell (Hell being not, as 
one of Sartre’s characters said, other people, 
but rather, contrariwise, the felt absence, the 
unreachability, of other people, even in their 
presence, and their deep failure too to reach 
oneself). 
F. Thus Part 1: Justine’s world. Part 2 adds into 
Justine’s world – which now, from a 
complicated dance of outside and inside, of 
actuality and possibility and impossibility 
text here. Shaviro’s remark (p.1) that 
“Melancholia affords us a truly 
depressing realisation. It shows us that 
these well-to-do people would rather 
see the whole world come to an end, 
than give up even the tiniest fraction 
of their wealth, power and privilege”, 
his accurate dissection of the hubris of 
property, connects in my view with his 
remark (p.4) that “We are given the 
prospect – or better, the tableau – of 
the end of the world as paralysis and 
impossibility”, in the following sense: 
It is not just that the rich are 
destroying the world. It is that we 
aren’t doing nearly enough to stop 
them. We are by and large willingly 
depressed into stasis. It is in this 
context that the film ought to be 
heard (as I press in sections 20-33) as a 
call to ‘arms’. While the rich play, the 
planet burns; we need to start to burn 
with anger that this be so, and find 
some way to stop it being so.  
{sidenote x} 
 
xi. As Shaviro helpfully puts it (p.6), “…for 
[Justine] the catastrophe has already 
happened. The end of existence holds 
no additional terrors; there is literally 
nothing left to worry about.” Though 
we should note that there can of 
course be something worse than 
death, certainly for the individual: 
namely, endless torture. Roughly this 
is thus another major feared end-
point of psychopathology, shared by 
many anxiety-depression scenarios of 
neurosis and delusions of psychosis 
(and of course by superstitious 
religions). {sidenote xi} 
 
xii. As I explicate in sections 22-6, the 
worst happening in fact literally starts 
to set the scene for Justine to emerge 
from the potentially-endless retreat 
that is severe depression (For 
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(No-one could be quite as bad as Justine’s 
boss), we know, and come to know better still 
in the same way, as we see her (Justine) in her 
fuller abjection – Claire’s world. In Part 1, we 
probably didn’t like Claire terribly much. In 
Part 2, we come to appreciate the terrible 
difficulty of living with someone like Justine 
(and with someone like John (Kiefer 
Sutherland)!). We come to appreciate Claire. 
Her patience, her love. We come to know and 
to be touched by her self, her world. Her 
ordinary unhappiness and happinesses, the 
ordinary anxieties of life (Claire, John tells us, 
“gets anxious so easily”…). She is closer 
probably for many viewers to being a natural 
avatar for oneself. 
G. We also gradually come to understand 
how inadequate she is to the threat of death. 
Two worlds may be about to collide. Her’s 
and Justine’s; Earth’s and Melancholia’s. The 
second Part of the film is no more (and no 
less) realistic than the first Part. It is a deep 
engagement with ‘the reality principle’, in the 
shape of utter vulnerability, death and its 
denial. This blue planet, our double, which 
shows us (from the prelude sequence 
onwards) the arbitrariness of our placedness 
and ‘security’ in the universe, and which 
crashes into us in spite of our best science, is 
in this sense no less (but also no more) 
unrealistic than the wedding party of Part 1. 
And, just as Justine struggles with the latter, 
so Claire, in all her caringness, cannot cope 
with the former. 
H. We pitied Justine earlier, and tried to 
empathise with her. But our position was no 
more secure (than hers). This is what Claire’s 
arc tells us. Facing death, being-towards-
death, is a near-impossible challenge. 
I. But we want to rise to that challenge. We 
want not to be Claire. Gradually, in Part 2, 
there is something to fear (Which there 
wasn’t, in Part 1, and yet angst was there, 
uncanny, massive). Claire majors on 
discussion, see 2.3 of my Wittgenstein 
Among the Sciences, Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2012, edited by Simon 
Summers. Cf. also section 4 of 
Shaviro.). {sidenote xii} 
 
xiii. Shaviro (p.13) writes of Leo “standing 
in for what Lee Edelman calls 
“reproductive futurism”. Edelman 
shows how the figure of the Child “has 
come to embody for us the telos of 
the social order and come to be seen 
as the one for whom that order is held 
in perpetual trust””. I confess to 
finding it profoundly depressing that 
Shaviro and Edelman despise this 
idea, which to many previous 
generations would have appeared 
what it is: the most elementary 
common-sense. As I argue in my talk 
“Love or justice?” (Conference: 
Changing the Climate: Utopia, 
Dystopia and Catastrophe, Monash 
University, Melbourne, Australia, 30 
August – 1 September 2010, 
http://rupertsread.blogspot.co.uk/201
0/-10/utopias-changing-climate-
conference.html), and in my “Care, 
Love and Our Responsibility to the 
Future” (Arena 35/36, 2011, pp.115-
123), the appalling way in which we 
are currently complicit in the slow-
motion destruction of that order 
speaks volumes about our values. 
Rather than placing ‘freedom’ and 
material gratification centrally, any 
sane society will place centrally what it 
can pass on to its most vulnerable 
members, who are its future: its 
children. See also sidenote xv, 
below.{sidenote xiii} 
 
xiv. For without this gift, Leo lacks 
resources to cope with his situation. 
As his essay comes to a climax, Shaviro 
claims (p.13) that the figure of the 
child as the film comes towards its 
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(ordinary) anxiety, ordinary unhappiness, 
rather than on depression. But these are not 
so far from being two sides of the same coin. 
Two worlds that can be seen clearer in the 
reflection of each other’s image. In the 
situation now unfolding, in the “dance of 
death”, without undue attachment to life and 
to desire, in the dance of Claire and Justine, 
the depressive sister is the better off. (This is 
the film’s distinctive contribution to 
investigating the ecology of depression; in a 
certain ‘niche’, depression is adaptive.vii We 
will return more than once to this point.) As 
Melancholia approaches, melancholia ebbs. 
The planet is (of course) not literally 
melancholia;9 it was just what occasioned the 
bringing of something to a head: The proper 
awareness of the preciousness of this 
timeless moment. 
J. Thus as Part 2 proceeds further, we avert 
from Claire10 and swing towards Justine 
again. She becomes the well-adapted one, in 
this new environment, this new world-with-a-
deadline. 
K. But this too needs to be interrupted. For 
Justine is caught up still in an unhealthy state 
of mind. She wants life to end.11 She is 
relieved by the prospect of the world coming 
to an end;viii now she is – at last – able to live! 
Our attraction to her hatred for the Earth / for 
life is of a kind with our attraction to her very 
state of mind. (I return to this point, below.) 
L. This isn’t what we sought yet; this isn’t yet a 
truly authentic life; this is far from being 
freedom from the confines, the iron cage, of 
the ego. Justine’s nihilistic words to Claire 
may attract us, but then on reflection repel us 
from her again; and appropriately so. The 
repulsion is accentuated by her brutality 
toward Abraham, the film’s Turin horse; and 
we should note that it is at this moment in 
the film, as she realises perhaps that there is 
no escape, that, significantly, she (and we) 
see the effects of Melancholia for the first 
climax is “deeply problematic”. I don’t 
accept this. On the contrary: Justine’s 
relationship with Leo at this point 
models the sanity that could enable us 
to avert climate-apocalypse (see the 
notes immediately preceding and 
following this one). What enables her 
at last to come to life is the realisation 
that this child is connected to her, 
without any other parent (Claire at this 
point being incapable, and John 
dead), and that her caring for him is 
long overdue (the long-delayed 
building-caves together). He is afraid 
and about to be extinguished. She can 
do something, in the time remaining. 
She can care for the future; she can be 
present for and to the child. The child’s 
future – precisely the figure that as a 
species we need to defend from 
ourselves (and especially from the 1%) 
– breaks through to her, now. And she 
breaks, and emerges from her ‘sleep’, 
her excessive retreat. {sidenote xiv} 
 
xv. Shaviro (p.13) castigates Justine (!) for 
caring for Leo more than for Claire. 
Justine does care profoundly and 
directly for Claire, at the death: see the 
remainder of section 22, supra. But it is 
also appropriate for her to offer more 
care to Leo: because children are not 
able to care for themselves, to protect 
themselves, as adults are.{sidenote xv} 
 
xvi. Shaviro helpfully calls it “a beautiful 
semblance” (p.12), and likens it in that 
specific connection to von Trier’s own 
film. I find less helpful his remark 
(p.13) that the ‘cave’, which is actually 
a kind of outline ‘teepee’, is “a self-
consciously exotic image”. The 
‘teepee’, made of natural materials, 
treading lightly on the earth, might 
suggest a greater sense of ‘oneness’ 
with nature than is to be found in 
4x4s, limousines, etc – i.e. than is to be 
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time. 
M. We are attracted by Justine’s nihilism; but 
this is a dangerous seduction that tells us 
something about ourselves, and thankfully 
we come to see this as we see that she is not 
a reliable moral ‘narrator’.12We were in denial 
about her, about our attraction to her – which 
is the attraction of melancholia. We needed 
shaking out of it. 
N. At this point, we can perhaps start to 
dialectically synthesise what is needed. 
Claire’s caring nature, her passion for life to 
go on, for her child to have a future; with 
Justine’s calm, her refusal to pretend, her 
presentness. The sisters are together, 
perhaps, one person waiting to be born, 
waiting to be the child, the future. This is 
where you (the viewer) come in. 
O. …The journey is not yet over, though. As I 
describe shortly (from section 19 onward of 
this paper), there is a rapid sequence of 
further shifts in the very final stages of the 
film, crucially tied up into Justine’s 
emergence as a brave and heroic, loving, 
feeling, quasi-maternal figure,ix when tested 
to the limit… 
13. This then is the real subtle meaning of the 
apparently-overly-literal-metaphor of Melancholia 
as another world, another blue world coming to 
meet ours. In the meeting, we (the film’s necessary 
other: its audience) find ourselves, find what kind 
of world we have, triangulate our world beside 
Justine’s and Claire’s. We christen our world, or let 
it start to grow up. (That’s us, sitting in a trio (with 
them) in the magic cave at the end.) We could 
imagine a Part 3 to the film, about another 
character in it, and then a Part 4, and so on and on 
until every human being in the world had had their 
world added in… But we don’t get to experience 
this, because there isn’t time in life to get to know 
everyone in the world. Our lives dance an arc, that 
ends with death. And sometimes this death comes 
much sooner than we hope. This is what we have 
found in the artefacts (especially of 
the 1%) that are at present 
committing us to climate-holocaust. 
Why ought the movement away from 
modernist Promethean hubris back 
toward ecological sanity be sneered 
at? See on this the cover and the 
content of Jonathan Lear’s splendid 
book, Radical Hope, a book detailing 
and discussing how the Crow people 
managed to cope with the 
dismantling of their conditions for 
survival: 
 
 
 
Compare: 
 
 
 
The image of the so-called ‘teepee’ is 
not an ‘exotic’ image: it is an image of 
extreme fragility in the face of forces 
bringing asymptotically total cultural 
destruction. Of a hope (an optimism of 
the will) that has nothing but its 
groundlessness and itself to sustain it. 
Liberalism, economic growth and the 
behaviour of the rich – in short, 
ecological crisis — raises for us just 
this spectre. The culture about whose 
destruction Lear wrote, and about the 
ability to maintain humanity and to 
feel and live even in the face of such 
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to live in authentic relation to. There is no Part 3 to 
the film, because, suddenly, the(ir) world ends. As 
yours and mine of course will, much as we are too 
often in denial about the fact. 
14. It is difficult to understand another’s world. But 
it can be done. But sometimes, in order to do it, 
one has to take a circuitous, ‘indirect’ route. When 
it is very difficult, then13 one has to (try to) take a 
deeply circuitous route that may even take one on 
a journey through nonsense,14 a journey through 
trying imaginatively to inhabit positions that are 
not even inhabitable. (As Rush Rhees had it: 
language makes sense only if living makes sense.) 
This is Wittgenstein’s method in philosophy, and it 
is also the method of some fine ‘philosophical’ 
films.15 
15. A key case of something difficult to understand 
of this nature, even though probably there is some 
of it in the world of every one of us (especially 
around the question of death), is denial. The film 
helps us to understand and work through our own 
tendencies to denial, and those of others. It 
brilliantly expresses those tendencies, those 
temptations, and finds and offers a way through 
and beyond them, back to life. In short: it exposes 
them (on film). Such that we may be better placed 
to enjoy life while it lasts – and to be clearer about 
how precious and glorious it truly is, and thus, I 
would add, about how we ought to strive to make 
the human adventure and the existence of our 
non-human kin last longer than we are currently 
threatening to let it. 
16. The scenario in the film is a neat inversion of 
the situation vis-à-vis climate-denial. (And what is 
climate-denial based in, if not: denial of death?16 A 
refusal to look in the face that we are at present, as 
a species, committing slow ecocide/suicide, in our 
4x4s, in our industrial-growth-capitalism, and so 
forth….) This time – in Melancholia – it is the loons 
and conspiracy-theorists who are right, and the 
scientists who err. In both the film and the real 
world, it is the pessimists who need listening to (At 
least, if there is going to be a wake-up call that 
leads us to do something about our predicament.) 
destruction, is precisely the culture 
that is (according to Shaviro) allegedly 
‘Orientalised’ and exoticised in 
Melancholia. But on the contrary: we 
must learn from just such indigenous 
people, if we are to have a chance of 
surviving culturally and ecologically 
the onslaught of climate-destructive 
capitalism. (As I argue also in my 
writings on Avatar: see endnote 6.) 
Thus it makes perfect sense that the 
‘magic cave’ is the fragile framework 
of (a) native-American dwelling. The 
outline of the cure that our culture is 
currently missing. {sidenote xvi} 
 
xvii. This is an important connection; 
Justine shows Leo care/love from the 
start. A child doesn’t need, of course, 
to be one’s own, in order to be loved: 
cf. sidenote xviii. See also my article on 
this point, “Our responsibility to the 
future: justice or love?”, One World 
Column, 12 June 2010, 
http://oneworldcolumn.blogspot.co.u
k/2010/06/our-responsibility-to-
future-justice-or.html.  
{sidenote xvii} 
 
xviii. Remember Claire asking Justine, “But 
where would Leo grow up?” Where 
Shaviro fails to see the point of this 
question, Justine responds to it, when 
she ‘breaks’, cries, emerges, and 
cares.{sidenote xviii} 
 
xix. Shaviro (p.6) writes, perhaps riffing on 
what I’ve taken as my first epigraph 
from Wittgenstein above, that “The 
end of the world cannot be 
understood, or experienced, as an 
event that happens within the world.” 
But the fact remains that Claire could 
potentially authentically face this, and 
life. We know this, because Justine 
does. On p.11, Shaviro argues further, 
following Ray Brassier, that “Life and 
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For: Back in the real world, back outside the movie-
theatre, there is in effect another planet smashing 
into us. Just very, very slowly… What 
anthropogenic climate change threatens is the 
(gradual) equivalent of the comet that 
extinguished the dinosaurs. We have to perceive 
this, our clear-and-present long-emergency, as an 
emergency even though it doesn’t feel like 
one….17 Part of the achievement of Melancholia is 
to depict the looming destruction of human life on 
Earth – the risk that life on Earth is (as Justine 
memorably puts it) “not for long” – as an 
emergency (as urgent; indeed, as rapid!), and yet, 
not as an emergency. The feel of so much of the 
film and of the discourse that occupies it is far from 
any emergency-talk.18 From the partying of the first 
half of the film to the distantiated feel of some of 
the second half, Melancholia actively reflects and 
thereby problematises inaction in the face of 
impending disaster. As part of its call to authentic 
affirmation of life in the present moment, 
Melancholia calls us to fight to prevent the rich 
destroying the Earth as a liveable planet,x by saving 
its atmosphere, keeping it life-giving (Note the way 
in which, in the film, the ‘fly-by’ makes the 
atmosphere less life-giving (less breathe-able)… 
The same move, notably, is made in Avatar (James 
Cameron, 2009), where humans are unable to 
breathe the CO2-heavy atmosphere of the extra 
planet in that film, Pandora.). 
17. “What’s the worst thing that can happen?” This 
ordinary, helpful question, very necessary for those 
(which includes us all) seeking to head off 
uncertain risks that may destroy us all, becomes 
less helpful – precisely through seeming to offer 
deep help – to the person inclined to depression / 
severe anxiety. What such depression/anxiety is is 
the imagining, over and over again, of what the 
worst thing is that can happen.19 It is a would-be 
self-protective race to the bottom. One seeks to 
immunise oneself against the future by giving up 
hope for anything good; one seeks to protect 
oneself against other people by imagining that 
they think the worst of one; one seeks to protect 
oneself against hope for oneself by imagining 
oneself hopeless/useless/evil… These stratagems 
sentience have already been emptied 
out by the prospect of their own 
inevitable obliteration.” This seems to 
me profoundly wrong, and profoundly 
dangerous, for the very reason that is 
implicit in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. To 
re-write just-very-slightly the relevant 
portion thereof, in the current context: 
“As in death, too, the world, when it is 
extinguished, does not change, but 
ceases. Death is not an event of life. 
Death is not lived through. But: If by 
eternity is understood not endless 
temporal duration but timelessness, 
then she lives eternally who lives in 
the present. Our life is endless in the 
way that our visual field is without 
limit.” Shaviro misses this, and thus 
misses the central lesson of the film, the 
great learning that Justine so painfully 
accomplishes at the death. The lesson 
that it is not true that einmal ist keinmal. 
No: Once is once, and once is forever. 
Nothing can actually take the present 
moment away from you. (This is on my 
understanding too the meaning of 
Nietzsche’s wonderful mad myth, of 
‘eternal recurrence’.) {sidenote xix} 
 
xx. To me, Justine’s comportment in the 
final several minutes of the film is 
nothing less than sublime. Shaviro is 
interested in an anti-sublime trope in 
von Trier’s film (cf. section 8 of his 
essay). But what is truly sublime is to 
realise that one is in a safe place, even 
when one could be forgiven for 
believing that one was in the unsafest 
place imaginable. The attitude of 
feeling absolutely safe, of taking 
refuge in the present moment (see 
sections 22-5, above), is a profound 
achievement, as it is in the scenario 
depicted to us in Melancholia. The 
ground has been prepared, by 
Justine’s melancholia; this is what 
provides her with the ‘transcendental’ 
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are very, very attractive;20 they are extraordinarily 
seductive; they are in the end disastrously self-
defeating. One can’t actually become safe by 
retreating away from others / from hope. One 
seeks to immunise oneself against disappointment 
by pre-emptively disappointing oneself (and 
others); but this only ups the ante, and takes one 
on a journey deeper into the morbid life-world of 
melancholia. The desire to be immunised against 
hope, the desire for disaster to absolve us of 
responsibility, and to prevent us pre-emptively 
from disappointment, is the very same desire in 
politics as it is in psychopathology. It is the desire 
that Melancholia explores. (I will begin in the 
coming sections to explain this point more.) 
18. “What’s the worst thing that can happen?” 
Followed perhaps by, “It’s not the end of the 
world!” …Ah; but what if it is the end of the world? 
Melancholia splendidly literalises this central trope 
of depression/anxiety, which is also a very 
necessary trope of ecology. (See the end of section 
16, above: No wonder Claire has an anxiety-attack / 
Melancholia makes our atmosphere less 
breathable, during the ‘fly-by’…) 
19. Claire says, diagnostically, to Justine, in a key 
scene in Part 2, “It’s easy for you, isn’t it? Just 
imagine the worst thing that can happen…”. She 
sees the attraction of Justine’s world now.xi The 
attraction, the would-be safety, of imagining the 
worst thing that can happen: ‘for example’, death. 
The death of everything, in 
fact.xii Geocide21/ecocide. We are tempted by this; 
this explains to a very considerable degree the 
attraction of disaster-movies, of apocalypse-
movies22 (also of most horror movies; and of the 
new unpleasant extreme-crime genre, post- The 
Girl With the Dragon Tattoo; and more besides). We 
imagine that if we can cope with these experiences 
fictively, then we can cope with them more easily 
in real life. Thus we half-want the world to be 
destroyed (in this film). We want it to go up in a 
shriek, and us with it. (And we half-half-want the 
worst thing that can happen to happen in the real 
world too. For then, we can be absolved of 
responsibility, of hope; we are given an indefinite 
conditions of possibility of 
authenticity (these conditions can also 
be provided by meditation, by 
mysticism, or by philosophy). 
Nevertheless, it is awesome to watch 
the achievement. From one’s own 
position of safety (But: you are alive, 
and that means you will die too, and 
so long as you are in anxiety then you 
are psychically and existentially 
unsafe) in the cinema… {sidenote xx} 
 
xxi. See sidenote xx, above. What is truly, 
ultimately sublime is simply: life. Any 
life. But one can only understand this 
if one has ‘awakened’. {sidenote xxi} 
 
xxii. Sadly, Shaviro doesn’t show an 
understanding of this. In the end (see 
endnote 29), in my view, he fails the 
challenge of the film / of Justine. He 
doesn’t essentially disagree with the 
literally world-weary cynicism of its 
mainstream critics. He fails at the end, 
when it most matters, to love life / to 
take care of the children, as Justine 
does (and as the hero of Children of 
Men (2006) does: See Cummings, Alex 
Sayf, “Narratives of Collapse: 
Melancholia, Take Shelter, and 
Children of Men”, Tropics of Meta 
(http://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com), 
April 27 2012, and my piece on 
“(Popular) Films as philosophy” on 
http://thinkingfilmcollective.blogspot.
co.uk/. {sidenote xxii} 
 
xxiii. Cf. p.3-4 of Shaviro, and sidenote v, 
above. {sidenote xxiii} 
 
xxiv. We are primates. Family, as Hegel 
rightly pointed out in The 
phenomenology of spirit, is literally the 
elementary community, the germ of 
society that liberalism and post-
modernism alike fail to be able to take 
seriously. Shaviro (p.13) badly misses 
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reprieve from having to try to act, and can simply 
spectate23…) 
20. But, thankfully, we pull back from this. We pull 
back from it, at the very end, in terror and horrified 
awe, with Melancholia bearing down remorselessly 
upon them / us. Only now, it is too late. And this is 
a crucial part of the film’s therapy.24Crucially: at the 
final moments, at the death, one doesn’t want 
ge(n)ocide any more, not even fictively. One wants 
life.25 
21. What could be more depressing than the end of 
the world? Especially, by our own hand (And now I 
am following up the logic of section 16, above.). 
Depression given this situation could even be 
described as rational. I am thinking here of 
Theodore Roszak, Mary-Jayne Rust, etc. Their 
ecopsychological vision – that one’s mental state 
may well be a reflection of the physical/biological 
state of the world that one is sensing – coheres 
well with the sense I have of von Trier’s film. The 
terrible thing, as one might put it, is that so many 
of us aren’t depressed (Think the people in Part 1 of 
the film. So much the worse for them, for us.). In 
Melancholia, the depressed one isn’t depressed by 
the end of the world (On the contrary). Claire is the 
normal, who gets thrown into anxiety by it. By the 
time enough of us get anxious/depressed about 
what we are committing the ecosphere to, it may 
well be too late. People, like Justine, mostly get 
depressed individualistically. Collectively, we watch 
the build-up toward destruction of our planetary 
home as a spectacle, alarmingly undepressed. 
That’s how it is, in Melancholia Part 1. It only 
changes in Part 2. It is almost as if we are willing the 
devastation of our home. 
22. Thankfully, Justine too pulls back from this 
wanting death, at the death. For the wonderful 
thing that happens toward the end of the film is 
that, under the most extreme pressure, with the 
worst thing that can happen now (it would seem) 
utterly inevitable, with hope gone, now, at last, 
Justine manages to emerge into living in the 
present. The embryo of this emergence is born I 
think at least by the time of her authentic and clear 
the point here, when he asserts that 
“By turning to Leo, and then by 
bringing Claire as well into the circle 
of the magic cave, Justine is able to 
share with them…her very sense of 
apartness…and disinterest.” She is 
disinterested in death (See sidenote 
xxxii and xxxi, below); this is her basis 
for strength, in the circumstances she 
finds herself in in Part 2. This is the 
foundation for the capacity to love, 
and even enjoy. To be present. Contra 
Shaviro: She opens the possibility of 
communion with those she is with, at 
the death. (Having said this, Shaviro is 
of course right in thinking that it 
would be a mistake to claim that at 
the end of the action Justine is no 
longer depressed. Her achievement is 
even greater than that. One doesn’t 
need to ‘cure’ oneself of depression, in 
order to take away its sting. One can 
be present and be-with-others, and be 
authentic, and care, and even enjoy 
life, even while being 
‘depressed’.) {sidenote xxiv} 
 
xxv. At p.10, Shaviro asserts that, 
“Although the name “Justine” is taken 
from the Marquis de Sade’s ever-
naïve-and-innocent eternal victim, 
von Trier’s Justine is [not] such a 
victim.” This is right, on my reading; 
but only because of the 
transformative journey that 
Melancholia assists Justine on. That is 
the burden of my reading of the film: 
that we are asked to seek to follow 
Justine on a journey from profound 
partly-self-inflicted victimhood to its 
opposite. This is a journey that we all 
need to go on, politically, as well as 
some of us needing to go on, 
psychologically (just as she 
does). {sidenote xxv} 
 
xxvi. Thus Shaviro is surely wrong to say 
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rejection of Claire’s unconvincing plan for them to 
drink wine on the terrace as Melancholia hits.26 It 
rapidly gathers pace with her embracing of the boy 
Leo, her decision to care for him in his fear; the 
crucial moment here – the film’s turning-point – is 
her crying as she hugs him. She breaks – as one 
might put it, reversing Bob Dylan – like a woman, 
like a heroine, this time. (The whole weight of the 
film is in this scene and the next one, in these final 
seven minutes of its running-time.) He can’t see 
this (but we can); she is feeling for him, grieving for 
someone other than herself: for the pain and the 
shortness of life of the child.xiiiShe has managed for 
the first time truly to escape the terrible confines of 
her own mind, the iron grey cage in which 
melancholia can hold one. She is back in empathy. 
Her finest hour is her last: She gives Leoxiv a blatant 
metaphor; she tells him a story (and they will then 
build visuals to go with it): of the ‘magic cave’. 
Adults should face authentically what is 
happening; children should be protected.xv So she 
builds the flimsiest structure imaginable, xvi to 
symbolise the truth: that (see section 23, below), if 
one can only live in the present, one is perfectly 
safe. She makes the ‘magic cave’ with him, then 
beckons first him, and then Claire, inside (Note: she 
supports Claire in, visually-mirroring Claire’s 
supporting her movements, in the opening 
portions of Part 2; this role-reversal is an iconic 
image of the teaching that the film offers one), and 
then joins them, having ‘completed’ the cave. This 
is very moving. They gradually hold hands, as the 
Wagner swells. The climactic moment is the 
wonderful – wonderful – smile that Justine gives 
Claire (at 2.02.25). The smile that tells that she is 
having, at last, what might be called a wonderful 
life, even amidst the real and psychical horror. It is a 
smile of love, of genuine connection, genuine 
being-with, at last. She looks authentically into 
another’s face, for the first time able to do so and 
offer something authentic that isn’t (only) sad. 
23. This is – with the possible exception of her 
smile earlier at Leoxvii — the first smile she has 
given anyone in the whole movie that is full. I 
mean: this smile comes from the depth of her 
whole being, it is a smile in the awareness of life 
(p.1) that “Melancholia is quite 
restrained, even as it literally depicts 
the end of everything”. On the 
contrary, the end is devastating; the 
movie-theatre itself shakes. (Shaviro 
remarks on p.11 that “Von Trier’s 
scenario of cosmic obliteration is not 
sublime, precisely because it is so 
determinedly literal. It works in such a 
way as to short-circuit all metaphor.” 
With that remark, I agree. That is why 
it can feel – be – so 
shattering.) {sidenote xxvi} 
 
xxvii. I think Shaviro is onto something 
when he says, in the final paragraph of 
his essay, that “Thinking back on 
Melancholia, I most vividly remember 
its moments of sheer, gratuitous 
beauty: the tableaux of the prologue, 
the shots of the planet Melancholia 
glistening in the sky [etc.]”. Beauty: 
these, and the wonders of the world 
we actually live in, are what must be 
saved; what it would be the ultimate 
crime to destroy. (Cf. also n.xxxiii, 
below.) Thinking back to the Prelude 
from the perspective of Justine’s 
transformation near the film’s end, 
one can see its beautiful moments as 
moments of life, of experience; that 
should be savoured, not rushed 
through (as consumerism, hedonism 
etc. encourages us to rush through 
them). Moments that von Trier 
spreads out visually over time, for us 
to take in. {sidenote xxvii} 
 
xxviii. All the prelude images, even those 
that seem as if they are or will be static 
(e.g. the Brueghel, and the sundial / 
chateau gardens) turn out to be 
depictions of change, impermanence. 
It is this with which Claire, in 
particular, has to come to terms (and: 
she doesn’t succeed in doing so). This 
connects, I would suggest, with 
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and its preciousness and beauty, rather than (as her 
smiles early in the film were, at best) an isolated 
moment of relief, or (more often) a show. This, by 
contrast, is the smile that reconnects and, in a 
sense, reassures. She, and thus potentially those 
with her, including us, are now very close to what 
Wittgenstein is speaking of in the “Lecture on 
Ethics”, when he speaks of “the experience of 
feeling absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in 
which one is inclined to say ‘I am safe, nothing can 
injure me whatever happens.’”27 (See how far we 
have come now from the fake safety of withdrawal, 
perhaps of paranoia, of hopelessness, certainly of 
pre-emptive disappointment.) The feeling to be 
sought-for, to train for, for when all (else) fails. In 
short: The film is about one’s desire to escape from 
one’s mental state (a desire that forms the central 
mechanism of depression and anxiety), about one’s 
desire for a reprieve from one’s responsibility to 
face up to one’s situation and act accordingly, and 
about the only genuine security there is: being 
present, no matter what. 
24. What is critical about this re-emergence of 
Justine is that it gives the lie to her brutal 
negativity a little while earlier.xviii At the death, she 
overcomes the vast, horrific temptation to think 
that the Earth and all its life is evil, that it would be 
better if we weren’t. She overcomes the great 
temptation that plagues Zarathustra: nausea at 
humankind. She reaches out, she lives and loves. 
She gives those she is-with, Leo and Claire, the 
ultimate gift: her presence, at last, in extremis. 
25. This is authenticity. Being-towards-death. Being 
able to face death, and not to be taken by it, as 
Claire is.xix Living together, at the end. Hand in 
hand. Claire, with support, does her best, but at the 
very last, cannot continue; she withdraws, into 
herself, in highest anxiety, covers her ears. Justine 
and the boy, Leo, keep going. Truly, this was their 
finest hour. The rising climax, this, the very end of 
the film, if one watches it with one’s eyes open, is 
staggeringly moving.xx 
26. But also: to quote from much earlier in the film 
(from Justine’s poor unconsummated husband, 
probably the only genuinely-beautiful 
moment in the ghastly wedding that 
we endured in Part 1 of the film: the 
sending of the balloons, symbols of 
hope and of transience, up and away 
into space. As Shaviro notes (p.3), this 
brave venture of the film into space 
itself is reminiscent of 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, another of the great 
transformative films in the entire 
history of cinema (see on this Peter 
Kramer’s reading, in his 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, British Film Institute, 2010); 
also of The Tree of Life, which was 
released almost simultaneously with 
Melancholia. There, the resemblances 
between the two films end, however. 
In particular: Melancholia is not only a 
bold but a deep and rich work, 
whereas The Tree of Life, is the only 
cinematic failure of Malick’s career, an 
over-reaching whose closing portions 
in particular are as weak as 
Melancholia’s are strong. In particular: 
The Tree of Life is very fine until about 
the last 30 minutes, when it lets one 
down badly; whereas Melancholia’s 
closing couple of scenes are its 
greatest strength of all. (Thanks to 
Andrew Klevan for help with this note, 
and in fact at several other points in 
the paper. Though I should stress that 
Andrew’s take on the film is radically 
discrepant with my own.)  
{sidenote xxviii} 
 
xxix. Shaviro rightly points out (p.9) that 
the ‘feminine’ genre of melodrama 
has been unfairly disparaged by 
critics, in standardly sexist fashion. We 
should add, however, that most of von 
Trier’s best films have elements of 
‘reclaiming’ melodrama to them: not 
just Melancholia, but of course also 
Breaking the Waves and Dancer in the 
Dark, and (I would suggest) Dogville 
(2003), too. (I think Shaviro is mistaken 
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Michael): “It could have been very different, 
Justine”. What we finally see is the possibility of 
living in the present, of overcoming the vast 
reasons to withdraw / to live in fear / to give up 
hope / to be a slave (thinking now of the famous 
last words of Leon (which are also Roy’s words) to 
Deckard, in Blade Runner).xxi The sadness of 
Justine’s life and of much of Claire’s too, is that 
such living in the present could not be achieved 
beforehand. If only one could live one’s whole life 
like that… That 
Wittgensteinian/Heideggerian/Buddhist ambition 
is what the film offers us as a possibility.28 Death 
may come at any moment. Let us live in that 
moment, this moment, authentically, and smiling a 
full deep smile if we possibly can.29 The viewer is 
invited to leave the auditorium ready to smile such 
a smile, and to live as Justine lived at the 
end.xxii There is no pseudo-Wagnerian love-death as 
such in Melancholia;xxiii because at the end, Justine 
is perhaps even a little in love with life. (It is helpful 
to note that in the final scene, as the big blue 
planet bears down on them, in one last great 
metaphor, Justine turns her back on Melancholia.) 
She loves her family,xxiv she loves human beings, at 
last, at (the time of) the death (of all things). She 
steps out of the victim-role.xxv 
27. But is the film nevertheless dangerous in its 
dalliance with apocalypticism? I suggest not. 
Rather, the film is a commentary on 
apocalypticism,30 just as (I argued near the start of 
my paper) it is a commentary on metaphor, a 
critical examination of it. It enters (us) into a 
therapeutic relation with our desire for the world to 
end, for the worst possible thing that can happen 
to happen, our desire, perhaps even, to 
‘cleanse’.31 This desire is of course not even all bad: 
one wants an end to suffering, a quick release from 
the slow journey of news and torments that may 
be the human race’s downgoing, perhaps even a 
cleansing from the Earth of excessive numbers of 
consumptive beings that are in effect 
consuming/destroying its life-bearing powers (the 
process of course turbo-charged by the very 
advertising industry that the Dunst and Skarsgård 
characters work in). But one comes to see that even 
to assert (p.9) that Bess (Emily Watson 
in Breaking the Waves) and Selma 
(Björk in Dancer in the Dark) are 
“utterly passive in their misery”. On 
the contrary: they both take decisive 
action, successful action, to save their 
loved ones, towards the end of their 
stories. In that way – in the sense of 
being active arbiters of their own fate 
– they partially anticipate the heroine 
of Dogville, at the close of that film.) At 
the close of section 6 of his essay, 
Shaviro analyses appositely von Trier’s 
own clear discomfort with this truth, a 
discomfort which is crystal clear in his 
own strangely negative reactions to 
Melancholia. (See 
http://www.melancholiathemovie.co
m/). Von Trier’s own take on 
Melancholia, I want to stress, is 
undermined by the way the film ends, 
as I’ve read that ending, above. I 
heartily agree with Shaviro that 
Melancholia is “non-ironic, heartfelt, 
and sincere”, in a way that von Trier 
doesn’t want to be ‘caught out’ being. 
Because it makes one ‘vulnerable’ to 
‘post-modern’ critics who are quick to 
condemn anything that is not ironic, 
and indeed cynical. My worry about 
Shaviro (see above) is that he too still 
falls too much into this category. By 
the end of his essay, he is complicit 
with the very nihilism that Melancholia 
overcomes. (Whereas my essay – 
seeking to take the reader on a 
‘therapeutic’ journey mirroring 
Justine’s, mirroring the very arc of the 
film itself as I read it – takes the risk of 
being criticisable as naïve, too direct, 
ingenuous. But such risks must be 
taken, if we are to respond to the 
demands that a film like this makes of 
us, as readers and (roughly) as activists 
who are (who should be) unwilling to 
ironise life to death.) {sidenote xxix} 
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if such destruction were rapid, it would still be 
terrible; and one comes to understand (as Justine 
does) just how precious and wonderful life is, and 
how bloodless it is to be ready to give up the 
human adventure. 
28. But all the same: Isn’t it wrong that the end of 
the world should be depicted as beautiful? It is 
indeed utterly awe-inspiring, magnificent in the 
true sense of that over-used word, when we see 
Melancholia bearing down on us in all its hugeness, 
in those final moments. But the right way to see 
what happens there also includes the sad but 
utterly understandable inability of Claire to stay 
with the trio in those final moments; the real fear 
evoked by that suddenly-rapidly-growing 
crescendo of noise – never have I felt in a cinema 
before like I was present at an earthquake; never 
has a fictional filmic disaster seemed more real; my 
mouth dropped open as the planet in all its 
hugeness bore down on them, on mexxvi – and, 
most important of all perhaps, the way in which, 
after the shock-waves, and before the enveloping 
blackness, comes a fire, burning up our loved and 
loving trio. This is not beautiful, it is just terrible, 
awful. (But in the end, the extreme beauty of much 
of the film is the beauty of our life. The wonder-ful 
life that finally Justine allows; the slow-motion 
(Think again of the prelude to the filmxxvii) moment-
after-moment life that we viewers still have the 
luxury of; the life that our decadent luxuries 
threaten to undermine the continuation of.)xxviii 
29. And after that end, what then? Blackness. One 
hopes for a Part 3. Or at least an Epilogue, like in 
von Trier’s magnificent melodrama Breaking the 
Waves (1996).xxix But, rather, as in the final lines of 
von Trier’s first great film, Zentropa: “You want to 
wake up… But it is not possible.” One only, after a 
pause, gets silent simple credits, still on black. This 
is the ‘final’ instalment of the therapy: Because now 
one really regrets what desire one had for the 
world to end. Your wish has been fulfilled: and it 
isn’t what you had hoped for. You wish that the 
world could go on. You wish that their lives could 
go on, that there could be a Part 3, and 4, and on 
xxx. Compare – and contrast – Shaviro’s 
argument in section 9 of his essay, 
where he finds Melancholia a self-
knowing mimesis. {sidenote xxx} 
 
xxxi. Shaviro remarks (p.13) that “There is 
no question, in [von Trier’s] films, of 
showing us another way of life [from 
that of annihilatory capitalism].” This is 
straightforwardly true of Last Year in 
Marienbad (cf. sidenote iii, above), and 
more or less true of Melancholia, 
though I would argue that the germ of 
that other way of life is present – its 
embers, its embryo – in the film’s final 
seven minutes, in Justine’s actions and 
her face. But mainly, the alternative 
implicit is for us to realise. The film 
functions as philosophy as therapy in 
the best sense of that word, in forcing 
upon us its viewers the responsibility 
to grow its truth beyond the point 
that it itself manifests. It offers us 
some conditions of possibility for what 
we might risk calling (see sidenotes xix-
xxii, above) ‘a political sublime’: 
through offering us a vision of 
communion (see sidenote xxiv, 
above). {sidenote xxxi} 
 
xxxii. Thus, on my reading, the film is not at 
all, as Shaviro takes it (p.12) to be, 
quasi-Schopenhauerian. Melancholia 
does not merely offer us a “seductively 
beautiful semblance” and free us 
“from the burden and tyranny of 
willing”. On the contrary! We need to 
be freed from the burden and tyranny 
of willing to live no matter what (the 
cost). Disinterest vis-à-vis (our 
ownmost) death gives us sublime 
safety. This is Justine’s gift to us, if we 
are ready to receive it. What we need 
to do is to seek to exist sublimely, with 
the will to seek to perpetuate the 
possibility of such existence (in our 
children and their children). We need 
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and on… But it is not possible. 
30. Only, of course: it is. For here you are! Still alive. 
In a place of voluntary ‘retreat’, but waking up 
slowly to the world again. In this sense, Melancholia 
is in the end a film ‘about’ the experience of 
watching a film like this: it is self-reflexive,xxx as any 
major therapeutic work must be.32 
31. The lights come on. Awareness grows that 
there is a world here / out there.xxxiHow wonderful, 
that you can stand up, breathe, talk with or touch 
your friends with whom you came to see the film, 
go out into the wide world: you are not stuck 
forever in a ghastly dream of reason/unreason … 
The film delivers you back into life, with an 
enhanced capacity to live and feel, to 
be.xxxii Perhaps, albeit a little haunted, and woken-
up, you will now take the chance not to live in 
ordinary unhappiness, nor in the fated but 
overcomeable land of melancholia, but will savour 
life. The way, finally, Justine could and did. The way 
the world is open to us always doing so, if only we 
can rise to the opportunity. 
32. If only, that is, we can touch the springs within 
us and all around us of endless life, in its true 
(Wittgensteinian) sense… 
33. The real Part 3 begins.33 Your world. Including: A 
world to save.xxxiii 
 
ENDNOTES 
1. (See Paul De Man, Allegories of 
Reading, Yale University Press, 1979.) 
That is, what follows is a personal, 
affective, account of the film. At the same 
time: I aim to bring out a/the experience 
which anyone could have who viewed the 
film with openness and some 
understanding. (For: I believe it is 
possible to write a very personal 
response to a film (which mine self-
consciously is) while simultaneously 
precisely to will. But we will only do so 
with the right content if we are able to 
live (and die) authentically. For 
example: in climate-change-
preventative-direct-action.  
{sidenote xxxii} 
 
xxxiii. The final paragraph of Shaviro’s essay 
focuses in helpfully on the small 
creatures of our world, that a 
memorable shot near the end of 
Melancholia suddenly shows us. 
Shaviro remarks (p.13) that “each of 
these creatures has its own needs, its 
own desires, its own values, and its 
own concerns.” Yes. ‘Man’ is not the 
measure of all animals. It is they as 
well as us that need to be saved (from 
us). The saving power is in us. Retreat, 
cynicism, hopelessness, the wish for a 
reprieve: these are the danger. But 
Von Trier’s and Dunst’s Justine has 
shown us how that very danger can, 
wonderfully, morph into its very 
opposite. The saving power is in this, 
in her, and thus (if we are open) in 
us. {sidenote xxxiii} 
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making strong value-judgements about it 
and about other films. I shall in passing 
seek to show that this is an intelligible 
project, in what follows.) But: that 
experience will of course in reality 
inevitably vary to some extent, in part 
dependent upon the ‘subject-position’ 
which one has (e.g. one’s degree of 
personal experience of melancholia; 
perhaps one’s gender), in part dependent 
upon one’s spiritual or existential starting-
point, and so on. (This is an inevitable 
feature of Wittgensteinian / ‘therapeutic’ 
philosophy: see below for more detail on 
this.) So: the resolution of the apparent 
conflict between the personal nature of 
the account here and the ‘objective’ 
claims I make for it (as a sound reading 
of the film) is via a proper understanding 
of how I, following Wittgenstein, take the 
nature of philosophy to be. The term 
“philosophical” doesn’t come down on the 
side of objectivity as against the 
personal: properly understood, it bridges 
the gap between the two. Films like 
Melancholia demand a personal 
response/involvement/continuation, as I 
shall describe. They are incomplete 
(without it). This means: not dominion of 
the film over us, nor dominion of the 
critic/theorist over the film, but rather: a 
dance. Watching Melancholia (and films 
relevantly similar to it, a number of which 
I refer to below) is in the best sense like 
going into psychotherapy (by ‘in the best 
sense’ I mean: not normalising, nor 
individual-ising, but rather individuating, 
joining in empathy, leading to growth and 
wisdom). It’s an ethico-political 
experience. “Personal”, as I am using the 
term, should thus not be equated with 
“subjective/subjectivistic”. No: an 
authentic personal response is 
demanded: which will inevitably mean: 
one that joins one with others. Authentic: 
as Justine painfully becomes authentic: A 
‘role-model’, by the film’s end, I shall 
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argue. Thus the film teaches us in the 
only way true teaching occurs: through 
facilitating the student(s) to learn for 
themselves. The personal is political-
philosophical. Strong value-judgements 
and interpretive judgements, judgements 
of quality, such as I make throughout this 
piece, are thus eminently compatible with 
the personal/allegorical nature of 
my/one’s journey with the film, as it is 
presented here for the reader to follow 
and engage with (and grow beyond). 
‘Objectivity’ hereabouts is only an 
appropriate standard if it is understood to 
arise out of a process like this. Such that 
we can then perhaps say, as I do, that 
Melancholia is a great work, greater even 
than von Trier intended. (Thanks to Peter 
Kramer for help working on this note.) ↩	  
 
2. See especially his Wittgenstein’s Method: 
Neglected Aspects (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2006, ed. Katherine J. Morris), for 
explication. ↩	  
 
3. One might also think of The 
Exterminating Angel (Luis Buñuel, 1962). 
Thanks to John Collins for this point. ↩	  
 
4. Harvard University Press, 1994. See 
especially Sass’s reading of The 
Invention of Morel (by Adolfo Bioy 
Casares, Argentina 1940) therein, a text 
which helped inspire Last Year at 
Marienbad. ↩	  
 
5. The character of the images is somewhat 
reminiscent of the 7 ‘postcards’ which 
preface each of the parts of Breaking the 
Waves. Justine, furthermore, is clearly 
worthy of comparison to the female 
protagonists of each of von Trier’s 
wonderful ‘Golden Heart’ trilogy of films. 
(Cf. on this point n.xxix, below.) ↩	  
 
6. And why? A speculation: Many of the 
reviewers are resisting the film. Resisting 
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its therapy. Because it boldly takes one 
on a therapeutic journey through despair 
to an almost transcendental affirmation of 
life. This is not the kind of journey most 
film-reviewers like to take. It doesn’t fit 
well with the ‘cool’ self-image they like to 
cultivate; it doesn’t fit with an easy 
cynicism, a knowingness and superiority 
to the films they aim to control, theorise, 
criticise, or even praise. One has rather 
to be ready to be in some awe of a film 
like this, and ready (as one might even 
put it) to let its magic work on one. One 
has to renounce the knowing ‘left-brain’ 
stance, the voice of cool Reason. There 
are few film-reviewers willing to renounce 
in this way, willing humbly to enter into 
the therapeutic, transformative space of a 
film like this. (My argument here is 
somewhat similar to my argument for 
why an apparently much less ‘high-brow’ 
(though equally transformative) film, 
Avatar, was disliked by as many critics 
as it was: see my paper thereon in 
Radical Anthropology 4 (2010), “The call 
of Avatar” (at 
http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org/
old/journal_04.pdf), and also my piece 
at http://thinkingfilmcollective.blogspot.co.
uk/2013/10/avatar-transformed-
cinema.html. Cf. endnote 30, below.) ↩	  
 
7. Think here of the opening of the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence, which 
famously states: “We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all…are created 
equal, that they are endowed…with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness” (italics added). It would be 
ludicrous if it read “…life, liberty and the 
attainment/full-realisation of happiness”. 
One might well have a right to life or to 
liberty. One certainly has no right to 
happiness (Think of Todd Solondz’s 1998 
film Happiness, for amplification…). This, 
I think, is a key point that the film is 
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making: The idea that there is either a 
right or a responsibility to be happy (or 
both), a kind of psychologising of liberal 
ideals in the context of a consumerist 
society (the kind of society America has 
become), is itself, von Trier is suggesting, 
a central cause of our unhappiness. The 
fantasy that we ought to be able to 
guarantee the avoidance of melancholia 
is itself a central cause of melancholia…. 
The arc of the film depicts eventually, at 
the very end, a chance for well-being, in 
the very acceptance – if it can, through 
great difficulty, be attained – of mortality 
and morbidity (including mental ill-
health). But to attain this, one has to 
recognise that anti-melancholic 
stratagems (e.g. rumination) are 
frequently the very disease of which they 
take themselves to be the cure… (And 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
works by riffing on these failed 
stratagems, much as Wittgenstein 
encourages one to vocalise (in order to 
see the absurdity of them) one’s 
metaphysical impulses: we might put it by 
saying that CBT creatively mimics the 
repeated thought-processes of 
anxiety/depression, in order to overcome 
them.) ↩	  
 
8. The brutal way she behaves as Part 1 
unfolds is partly forgivable, against the 
background of that world, a world of 
forced appearances of happiness (see 
above), of horrendous parents, of 
mythically-bad employers: of uncaring 
capitalism and inequality-rampant. The 
way her family (her mother in particular) 
‘do her (head) in’ leads her to ‘express 
herself’ in ways that are not productive – 
as the ways she expresses herself 
toward the end of the film are – of any 
kind of accommodation with life. Before 
that, the film also shows intelligently how 
difficult it can be to be around someone 
with depression. ↩	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9. If one thinks of Melancholia as a world 
coming to strike one with devastating 
power, one is in a way thinking quite 
accurately (Depression as being knocked 
sideways, brutally, for no reason (or for 
‘good’ reason), and in a way thinking in 
terms of an unbelievably crude metaphor. 
“Melancholia” as the name of a planet is 
itself thereby an alienating effect (cf. 
n.xxx, below), of the kind that we 
repeatedly find in this film, as in many of 
von Trier’s films. To force us into what I 
call therapy, by means of our noticing the 
way in which this film (for that is what it 
is) is working on us, and forcing us to 
reflect – and to mirror the state of 
alienation of the characters, starting with 
(but not finishing with!) Justine. ↩	  
 
10. Though we need to acknowledge already 
how far ahead she is of John! As the 
return of Melancholia shatters his 
scientific confidence, we see how thin 
was the veneer of his faith in life; he can’t 
bear the situation, his failure, doom 
impending; he actually does kill himself, 
when one had thought that it would be 
Justine or Claire, if anyone, who did 
so. ↩	  
 
11. This may be the best explanation (though 
see also sidenote viii) of the otherwise-
weak ‘soft-porn’ scene in which she 
bathes naked in the night-light, perhaps, 
as it were, inviting Melancholia to come 
and destroy the Earth. The point about 
this scene, and about this temptation, this 
attraction – the thought that she brings 
on Melancholia, that she helps to bring it 
to crash into Earth (just as one actually 
bears some responsibility for one’s 
depression, for depression is attractive 
and one can give all too easily into 
temptation) – is I think this: that this is a 
temptation and attraction that the film 
itself offers the viewer, and perhaps 
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brings out in the viewer. This is one of 
the film’s last temptations, in the dizzying 
emotional-thoughtful journey that one 
goes on as the end becomes nigh. The 
desire to have Melancholia crash into 
Earth is a desire that the film brings to 
consciousness in the viewer. But, as I will 
explain shortly: this desire too needs to 
be – and is – overcome. ↩	  
 
12. There is a parallel here with the (it turns 
out) unreliable ‘chorus’ of the native 
onlooker in The King Is Alive (2000), one 
of the greatest of the Dogme 95 films 
(And we should note in passing that the 
Dogme 95 films invariably, like most of 
von Trier’s oeuvre, share with 
Melancholia a profound interest in altered 
mental states / in deep psychical pain / in 
psychopathology). That film plays 
cleverly and therapeutically with one’s 
desire to believe the exotic indigenous 
‘narratorial’ voice, which literally looks 
down on the petty activities of the 
increasingly-desperate westerners as 
they struggle to survive; for gradually, as 
their ‘journey’ takes them to a new 
reconciled mutuality, through the vehicle 
of their efforts to learn and play 
Shakespeare in the midst of their crisis, 
they outflank his nihilistic words, and the 
words that they speak come to have a 
great deeper meaning and role, binding 
them together, healing, acting as a deep 
group-therapy. In the case of 
Melancholia, it is Justine herself who 
eventually comes to overcome her 
nihilistic words: as I describe below. (The 
case of Memento (2000) is similar too: 
the morally unreliable narrator turns out 
to be Leonard, the protagonist-narrator 
himself. For detail, see Hutchinson’s and 
my reading of this great philosophical 
film, in my and Goodenough’s Film as 
Philosophy: Essays on cinema after 
Wittgenstein and Cavell, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005.) ↩	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13. Like Winch with the Azande; like Kuhn 
with Aristotle; like Sass with ‘the 
schizophrenic mind’. ↩	  
 
14. On this, see the closing passages of my 
Introduction to Film as Philosophy. See 
also Cora Diamond’s work on 
Wittgenstein. ↩	  
 
15. Besides the films that I refer to in my 
Introduction to Film as Philosophy 
(including, notably, Peter Greenaway’s 
greatest films), other films in this 
category include, I believe, Never Let Me 
Go (2010), The Road (2009), Hiroshima 
Mon Amour (1959), Donnie Darko (2001) 
and Bergman’s Persona (1966). See the 
case made for some of these films, and 
more, over 
at http://www.thinkingfilmcollective.blogsp
ot.co.uk/ ↩	  
 
16. See my “Growth and Death”, One World 
Column 
(http://oneworldcolumn.blogspot.com),  
17 July 2010: at 
http://oneworldcolumn.blogspot.com/201
0/07/growth-and-death.html. 
(Melancholia might be profitably read 
alongside a film which also appeared in 
2011 and with which it has sometimes 
been compared: Take Shelter. The latter, 
like Melancholia, might appear 
superficially to support climate-denialism; 
read more deeply, the opposite is true: 
See Sam Earle’s “A Voice Crying in the 
Bewilderness”, Sam Earle’s Blog, 
February 28 2013, 
http://samearlesblog.wordpress.com/201
3/02/28/a-voice-crying-in-the-
bewilderness/. Rather, they accustom us 
painfully to come to terms with the 
unbelievable truth, a truth as hard to 
listen to as the truth that we as 
individuals are going to die: the truth of 
the very real possibility of climate-
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apocalypse destroying even our 
collective existence.) ↩	  
 
17. I attempt to rise to this challenge in my 
paper, joint with Phil Hutchinson, 
“Wittgenstein and Pragmatism” in the 
Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism 
(Malachowski, A. (ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.) 
Hutchinson and I argue in this piece that 
we humans should feel shame at the 
future we are currently co-creating, and 
even perhaps experience pre-emptively a 
hypothetical ‘grief’ for the children and 
future people we are threatening – for 
these might well be just the emotions 
needed, to prompt us collectively to stop 
the extinction of civilisation… ↩	  
 
18. See my article on this, “Emergency Talk”, 
The Guardian, Tuesday 13 November 
2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree
/2007/nov/13/emergencytalk. ↩	  
 
19. It may seem that the extreme deadening 
characteristic of much depression is a 
counter-example to this. (As for instance 
in the partial-derealisation Justine suffers 
on eating the meat-loaf that “tastes like 
ashes”.) But actually I think it is a 
defence against it. In other words: one 
avoids the thinking of what the worst 
thing is that can happen only by 
deadening oneself to it (and to everything 
else). By deadening, flattening out life to 
nothing. ↩	  
 
20. I explore their attractions in detail in the 
chapter of my Philosophy for Life 
(London: Continuum, 2007) that gives a 
reading of The Lord of the Rings 
accordingly, and in section 2.3 of my 
Wittgenstein Among the Sciences 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, edited by 
Simon Summers). ↩	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21. Cf: “How to destroy the Earth”, 
Geocide, http://qntm.org/destroy! (More 
seriously, think of the not-untempting (if 
unappetising) challenges posed by 
Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been 
(Oxford University Press, 2006), and the 
Voluntary Human Extinction Movement 
(http://vhemt.org/). Thanks to Kristof 
Bodnar for these references.) ↩	  
 
22. And of eschatology: the not-un-
widespread emotional attachment to 
apocalypse-narratives can of course be 
traced back to the medieval world and 
further. ↩	  
 
23. Which is what the film seemingly 
encourages us to do: and (as I describe 
below) also pulls us through and beyond 
such encouragement, to a turn to 
activism, away from a melancholic state 
of powerlessness or from a more or less 
evil attraction to inaction and cynicism. ↩	  
 
24. The movement of thought and feeling 
here mirrors (and inverts) closely that 
depicted in Kazantzakis’s/Scorsese’s The 
Last Temptation of Christ (1988): As 
Christ overcomes the temptation to want 
his life to go on, to renounce the cross. 
(Cf. n.33, below.) ↩	  
 
25. The rhythm of the rise and fall of the 
heavenly bodies in this film reminds one 
at this point of the extraordinary idea 
present at the end of Native American 
vision/wilderness quests: that, on the last 
night of one’s quest, one has to want the 
Sun to come up again, for it to do so. 
One has to stay up all night, and will it to 
come up. You have to will life to go on. 
This idea seems completely absurd until 
one has actually experienced it, when 
suddenly it is alarmingly, breathtakingly, 
affirmingly real to one. This is the effect 
of this film, too: It is now up to you, up to 
us, to ensure that life goes on.↩	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26. Such moments of starting to come to life 
again are sometimes the most 
dangerous, for a seriously-depressed 
person. Why? That’s the point at which 
some depressed people kill themselves, 
because they cannot bear it when they 
find themselves starting to hope again 
(because then they risk being 
disappointed; they are no longer ‘in 
control’). On the possible reading of the 
film in which the second Part is Justine’s 
(or Claire’s) fantasy of world-catastrophe, 
of one’s / the world ending, then, it would 
not be surprising that her (and 
everyone’s) death comes soon after such 
a moment. (Our sharing of Justine’s will-
to-the-death-of-all, our wanting 
Melancholia to hit, is our own yielding to 
the attractions of the depressive vision. If 
only we end the struggle, if only we 
giving up seeking to save our planet’s 
threatened ecology, then, we fantasise, 
we won’t hurt so much. Cf. endnote 30, 
below.)Ǥ↩	  
 
27. See p.42 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Occasions (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1993). ↩	  
 
28. Heideggerian being-towards-death 
authentically is sometimes referred to by 
Heidegger as ‘resoluteness’ or 
‘resolution’. The reader may notice an 
interesting connection, perhaps more 
than merely verbal, between this and the 
‘resolute’ reading of Wittgenstein (aka the 
‘therapeutic’ reading). This connection 
might be explored for instance with 
regard to the broadly-Heideggerian kind 
of reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
that has been essayed by Eli 
Friedlander. ↩	  
 
29. Thus in the end the problem deliberately 
offered to one by this film, like so much in 
philosophy, is, just as Wittgenstein held, 
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a problem of the will much more than of 
the intellect. Resistances of the will need 
to be overcome. The real problem with 
Melancholia’s critics is that they don’t 
want to understand what the film is 
calling us to. Because to hear that call 
would open them to the need to act, and 
to the risk of disappointment. In other 
words, and in a savage but unavoidable 
irony: the film’s critics are willing 
themselves to remain in the depressive 
position. They deliberately reject the 
transformation that the film offers one, in 
its final 30 minutes or so. ↩	  
 
30. As outlined in section 21, above: Our 
calmness in the face of impending 
catastrophe – our ability, most of us, 
most of the time, to somehow be calm as 
we gradually commit the planet to very 
dangerous climate change, and perhaps 
to the Venusian scenario which James 
Hansen now fears (See e.g. Hansen, 
James, “Making Things Clearer: 
Exaggeration, Jumping the Gun and The 
Venus Syndrome”, 15 April 2013, 
http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/
2013/20130415_Exaggerations.pdf) – is 
terrible. Given that this apocalypse is one 
we could stop. Melancholia, like Avatar, 
is literally a call to us to awaken (The two 
films share for instance a deep interest in 
waking-up, in eyes opening (or closing): 
see the very start and end of both). 
Calmness is only an appropriate attitude 
in the face of inevitable catastrophe – 
such as the characters in Melancholia 
face, at the end. Melancholia models how 
to act in the most extreme of 
circumstances (In this respect, by the 
way, it connects very closely with 
Malick’s masterful The Thin Red Line 
(1999), especially as read by Simon 
Critchley in his essay thereon that was 
published in my and Goodenough’s Film 
As Philosophy collection). And it leads, if 
one actually hears it, to a will to seek to 
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prevent the catastrophe that humans are 
currently building, which could create just 
such circumstances, globally. ↩	  
 
31. In this way, it bears a close family-
resemblance to Dancer in the Dark 
(2000). Which was a masterful anti-
musical; a musical offering a very critical 
reading of the genre of musicals. 
Melancholia is a disaster-film that 
critically reads the desires of the viewer 
of a disaster-film. The resemblance 
between the two films is close, because 
Dancer in the Dark too played directly 
with the question of just how bad things 
could get. Each song resulted in things 
reaching a new low. ↩	  
 
32. Any reader in doubt as to von Trier’s own 
strong interest in film as a therapeutic 
experience should watch or re-watch his 
The Five Obstructions.↩	  
 
33. The resurrection, as one might put it. 
(Look again at the Christ-on-the-cross-
like image of Justine in the film’s Prelude. 
In this vein, we should note that Justine 
is an inheritor of Bess, von Trier’s Christ-
meets-Mary-Magdalen figure from 
Breaking the Waves. As Bess pushes 
her bike up the hill like a cross, having 
been forsaken by her mother, in this 
tremendous scene therefrom, the phrase 
“Christ on a bike” takes on for the first 
time ever a serious meaning:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDZQs
pZ5PBc .) ↩ 
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